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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LA\VRENCE H. STRATFORD and 
ELLA L. STRATFORD, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents .. 
-vs.-
GI£0RGE G. vVOOD and LEAH C. 
\VOOD, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 9198 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF F A·CTS 
~\~ stated in appellant's brief, this case involves an 
action to quiet title to real property and for damages 
arising out of the use of respondents' property by appel-
lants. Appellants' answer claimed a prescriptive right to 
the use of respondents' property. By the pre-trial order, 
the issues of the case were designated as being three in 
nnn1ber, as follows: (1) 'Vhether or not there was a 
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prescriptive use as claimed by appellants; (2) The loca-
tion of the survey line between the property of appellants 
and that of respondents, i.e., whether the correct survey 
line is that established by Robert A. Vlilkins, or that fixed 
hy Bush & Gudgell; ( 3) The damages to respondents 
(R. 6). 
Rather than approaching the facts of the case by way 
of an abstract of the trial transcript, as was done in ap-
pellants' brief, respondents believe a chronological ap-
proach will prove more helpful to the Court in under-
standing the case. At the time of the trial and for some 
years prior, respondents were the owners of Lots 11 to 13, 
inclusive, and appellants were the owners of Lot 10 and 
part of Lot 9 of Block 5 of the Groves Subdivision in 
Emigration Canyon. These properties adjoin one an-
other. There is no fence or other physical dividing line 
between the two properties. 
From 1928 until 1939, Lots 11 to 13 were owned by 
Emeline L. Whitney. In 1939 this land was conveyed to 
respondents (Exh. P-2, pages 19, 24). During the period 
from about 1927 until 1941, Lot No. 10 was owned by 
1\frs. Whitney's daughter-in-law, Mrs. Edwin Whitney 
(R. 117; Exh. P-10; R. 121). In 1941, Lot No.10 was con-
veyed to James A. Stevenson (Exh. P-10), who conveyed 
it to appellants in 1943 (Exh. P-12). 
At the tune the Edwin Whitneys acquired Lot 10, 
there were stakes on all four corners of the property, and 
these stakes were recognized as the boundary line between 
Lots 10 and 11 (R. 117). Mr. Whitney testified that the 
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l()('at ion of the boundary line between Lot~ 10 and 11 as 
tile propt•rty \\·as recognized b~· his rnother and hirnself 
during the time they owned the propert~· ·was within a 
foot to a foot and a half of the location of the corner 
n~ established by the survey of Bush and Gudgell (H. 
111-S). On motion of appellants' counsel, the evidence 
of where the vVhitneys recognized the property line to 
he \nu.; excluded b~· the Court. Counsel contended, in ob-
taining the exclusion of this evidence, that there \Vas no 
shmring that the stakes which the vVhitneys recognized 
a~ the boundary line were sluve~· stakes (R. 121). 
Prior to 1943, when appellants acquired Lot l\ o. 10, 
the~· had never been on the property (R. 91). At the 
time appellants purchased the property there were two 
patio areas to the north of their cabin, in rnuch the same 
loeation as they are presently located on the land (R. 
s;)). Appellant testified that they use [present tense] 
tlw~f' patio areas when they have guests con1e to their 
cabin (R. 86). There was no evidence as to how early 
appellant started this use, nor how frequent the use was. 
In June of 1954, appellants built a cabin on Lot No. 
11, owned by respondents (R. 45; 51), and also construct-
ed a large conerete picnic. table on one of the patio areas . 
. \t the time the eabin was being eompleted, respondents 
had a conversation with appellant and requested that 
he rernove the cabin from respondents' property (R. 47, 
;):2 l. Respondents repeatedly requested appellants to re-
move the cabin, but appellant would only respond by ask-
ing how they knew it was on respondents' land (R. 47). 
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As a result of these conversations, respondents had sur-
veys made of the property, in an effort to get appellants 
to retnove the cabin fron1 respondents' property, which 
he never did (R. 48-9). 
The first survey was made by Robert A. \Vilkins, 
a n1an 72 years of age. He testified he had not located 
the section corner to which the subdivision was tied (R. 
72). He stated that in 1937 he had surveyed smne land 
in the vicinity, and at that time he had seen a sandstone 
n1onu1nent at what he determined was the corner of Lot 
13 of Block 17. In making his survey in 1956, the sand-
stone 1nonu1nent was not to be found (R. 71), so he com-
Inenced his survey of the property from a place which his 
recollection told him the monument had been 19 years be-
fore (R. 70-3). Starting from this beginning point, he 
ran his survey by 1neans of traverse lines (R. 73), the 
angles on which he turned by the use of the con1pass of 
his transit (R. 78). He testified that he did not check 
the accuracy of his traverse line by running the traverse 
line back to his beginning point, but rather had only rllll 
his traverse line to the property (R. 83). 
The official plat of the Groves Subdivision contains 
no reference to any sandstone monument, such as Mr. 
Wilkins testified he had tied his survey in 1937 (Exh. 
P-4). 
The second survey made of the property by respond-
ents was conducted by George Gudgell of Bush & Gud-
gell. In 1naking his survey, the section corner to which 
the subdiivsion is tied was located (R-14), and the survey 
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nm l'rom there "·'" the use of the Yl~rmer scale on the 
t rau~it to turn angles. A traverse line was run up to the 
propPrty and a return traverse line was run to check the 
orginal, which closed accurately to approxi1nately one and 
a half inches ( R. 107). In addition to tieing the survey to 
tltt> ~Pdion eorner~ J\Ir. Gudgell checked his survey line 
agnin~t hro eotmt~, 1nonun1ents placed in the road up the 
('an~·mt, \\·hieh are in turn tied into the section corner by 
the 8alt Lake County surveyor. 1-lere again there -vvas a 
\·t·r~· <'lo~P check to his survey line (Exh. P-3; R. 15-16). 
In running up the canyon to respondents' property, 1\Lr. 
(; wlg('ll also tied in several fence lines which checked out 
quite close to his survey (R. 16). A1nong the natural 
monuments which J\lr. Gudgell checked to on his survey 
\ra~ a rock wall and fence corner dividing appellants' 
propert~, frmn that of his neighbor to the south and this 
<'ltecked YPr~- close, indicating appellants under the Gud-
geli HUTe~· has the entire eighty feet of land ·which they 
purchased, independent of the patio area which vvas in 
eonfliet at the trial ( Exh. P -5 ; R. 21). 
::\lr. \\'"ilkin~ loeated the property line 17.~ feet north-
erly frmn 1Ir. Gudgell's location. The cabin built by 
appellants was ten feet north of Mr. \Vilkins line on 
respondents' property. The importance of the testimony 
of :Jlr. \Vilkins as to how he ran his survey line was 
demonstrated to the jury by J\t[r. Gudgell who showed 
them the difference between turning angles with a com-
pass versus turning them with the vernier scale of the 
transit. The transit compass is only divided into 360 
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degrees. The vernier scale on the transit accurately 
divides each of the 360 degrees of a circle into 60 parts 
so that the chance of error in turning the angle is greatly 
1ninirnized (R. 106). Further, hy the use of a compass, 
the presence of any n1etallic substance in the near vicinity 
can pull the compass needle off. ~.fr. Gudgell testified 
that a 1netallic pencil in the surveyor's pocket could pull 
the compass off as n1uch as three or four degrees if the 
pencil were within three or four inches of the cmnpass 
(R.107). 
A third survey line was rnade by l\1r. Arnold Coon 
for appellants. Iie located the division between the prop-
erties three-eighth of an inch frmn where l\1r. Gudgell 
did (R. 114). 
Appellants had the use of Lot No. 11 for a period 
of five and one-half years frmn June 1954 to the time 
of trial. Respondents did not have any use of the prop-
erty during that period while they were atte1npting to get 
appellants off (R. 54). Respondents therefore claimed 
damages for the loss of use of the premises during that 
period. Further respondents claimed damages for the 
cost of re1noving the cabin frmn their property. ::\Ir. 
I{etchuln testified as an expert that if the cabin were to 
be removed without substantial damage to the trees and 
foliage on the lot, it would cost $100.00 (R. 30-1). 
l\ir. Holt testified as an expert witness that the value 
of Lot 11 was $2500.00 (R. 35), and that the rental value 
of the land would be $250.00 per year (R. 36). On ex-
mnination b)~ the Court, the witness testified that the 
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lntHl wa~ of valne to tlw public only for cabins . 
. At thP conclu~ion of appellants' case, a nwtion for 
a di rPdPd ve rdid wa~ granted on the i~~lW of w·hether or 
not appellants had established a prescriptive use on 
rP~pondents' property. ~ o (1uestion of the correctness of 
tlw court's granting of this rnotion is made on this appeal. 
At the tin1e counsel for appellants was nmking his 
argument~ to the jur~·. he rnade the staternent that the 
propt-rt:· in dispute between the two surveys had been 
mwd h:· appellants' predecessors for 35 years. Respond-
ent:-; objected to this argtunent and the court sustained 
rP~llondPnt~' objection. After counsel had con1pleted his 
argument and the jury had retired, the court stated the 
matter into the record, and the parties thereupon stated 
their position~ with respect to the excluded argtnnent (R. 
138--!0). 
STA~eE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL AS TO USE OF THE 
PROPERTY BETWEEN THE TWO SURVEY LINES WAS 
ll\IPROPER, AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EX-
CLUDED SUCH ARGUMENT. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS COON. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS RESPECTING DAM-
AGES IS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW WITH 
RESPECT THERETO. 
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THE ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL AS TO USE OF THE 
PROPERTY BETWEEN THE TWO SURVEY LINES WAS 
IMPROPER, AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EX-
CLUDED SUCH ARGUMENT. 
At the conclusion of appellants' case, the trial court 
granted a motion for a directed verdict on the issue of 
whether or not appellants had any prescriptive right to 
the use of the respondents lands. No error is assigned 
to this ruling on appeal, and therefore, it must be deemed 
to have been proper. 
There were therefore only two issues for the jury 
to determine: (1) whether the Gudgell survey was cor-
rect, or whether the Wilkins survey was correct; and (2) 
the amount of damages to which respondents were en-
titled. There was no contention made for a boundary 
line by acquiescence. 
Prior to the time that the court had made its ruling 
on the question of prescriptive rights, there was certain 
evidence which could properly come into the case for its 
probative value on the question of prescriptive use, which 
would have been improper were that issue not involved 
in the case. A brief examination of this evidence is there-
fore appropriate to detennine first of all, whether coun-
sel's rmnarks were supported by the evidence, and second-
ly whether this evidence could properly be considered 
as bearing upon the two issues which were submitted 
to the jury. 
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( )n tltr question of how the property ·was used, there 
\\'l'I'P only hro witues:::;es whose testirnony touched upon 
this point: Appellant and Edwin vVhitney. 
Appellant first rnoved onto the property rn 1943. 
He \Hls asked to describe the condition in 1943 of the 
a rt>a between his main cabin and the sleeping cabin which 
lw built. He described two patio areas and a generator 
house a~ being in the area (R. 85). In addition, he volun-
terrecl two additional pieces of information: (1) that 
the ('OllC'l'ete on the patio had been built by Ed vVhitney in 
1 !l:2-h ancl contained :Mr. Whitney's son's initials "T. vV.", 
and (:~) that I\lr. vVhitney generated the electricity for his 
house frmn the generator shed (R. 85). He next testified 
that the patio areas are the same size nmv as they ·were 
in 19-13, that he built a concrete table to seat 17 persons 
on on patio, and that his ·wife uses the other one for a 
erowd of people she gets up there. Important in this con-
neetion is that l\ir. \Yood -vvas testifying in the present 
tense in connection ·with the use of the patio areas by hirn 
and his wife (R. 86). 
{~pon cross exan1ination nfr. Wood testified that he 
had never been on the property until 1943 when he pur-
ehased it (R. 91). He testified that he did not know of 
the \\·ay the property was used by his irnmediate pre-
decessor, l\[r. Stevenson, except that Mr. Stevenson didn't 
use any of the property very much based upon the condi-
tion of the main cabin when they bought the property 
(R. 91). lie testified that he could not say one way or the 
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other as to whether :Mr. Stevenson used the patio areas 
(R. 92). 
r_ehe other witness who offered any testimony as to 
the use of the property was .Mr. Edwin Whitney. His 
testi1nony was offered after respondents' 1notion for 
directed verdict was granted by the court. His testimony 
offers an interesting cmnparison with the matters which 
counsel attmnpted to argue at the trial, and vd1ich he 
states as being a fact in the brief. First, he testified that 
he acquired his property in 1927 (R. 114), three years 
after he is supposed to have built the patios according 
to appellant's testimony. lie and his mother, who owned 
the Stratford lot at this tin1e, recognized a boundary line 
very close to that established by :Mr. Gudgell, according 
to son1e stakes which were located at the corners of the 
property when he acquired it (R. 117-8). 
To Mr. Whitney's testi1nony, appellants' counsel 
objected on the basis that the stake to which l\fr. Whitney 
referred as being the boundary line recognized by him 
and his mother was not shown to be a surveyor's stake 
(R. 121). The court then ordered the jury to disregard 
l\Ir. Whitney's testi1nony as to the stakes on the prop-
erty as not being shown to be a correct survey line (R. 
123). 
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that there 
was no competent evidence which was admitted as to any 
past use of the area between the two survey lines. Tak-
ing appellants' testimony at full value, even though it is 
obvious that he had no personal knowledge whatsoever 
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ot' the true J'ads prior to 19-!3, we have only that ~Ir. 
\\"hitm·)· built two patios and a generator shed on his 
nwth<>r'~ property. It should be rather obvious that a 
son can build structures on his 1nother's land without 
hi~ nd~ meaning the son clain1s mvnership of the land 
or even of the structures. There is no evidence what-
soever as to how the property was utilized prior to J nne 
of 1954 when ~[r. \Vood built the picnic table and cabin. 
Gauging counsel's arguments in the light of the evidence 
manifests that it was improper for him to argue to the 
jury that the land between the Wilkins and Gudgell sur-
H')' had been occupied for 35 years by the owners of the 
'V ood cabin, when the evidence does not support the 
statement, and the court had ruled out any question of 
adverse user. 
If, as appellants contend, the parties owning appel-
lants' property had used the area between the two sur-
ve)'S for a period of 35 years, it is apparent that appel-
lants would have been entitled as a matter of law to a 
prescriptive right to use the property. Yet appellants 
do not argue that the court committed error in directing 
a verdict that appellants had no prescriptive right by 20 
years user. 
The law is very clear that counsel must keep his ar-
gmnent confined to the questions in issue and the evi-
dence relating to these issues. 
In 53 An1. Jur. 385, Trials, Section 480, it is said: 
"It is fundamental that the argument of coun-
sel should at all ti1nes be confined to the questions 
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in issue and the evidence relating thereto adduced 
at the trial, and such inferences, deductions, and 
analogies as can reasonably and properly be 
drawn therefrom. There is no rule of trial prac-
tice more universally accepted and applied than 
the rule that counsel may not introduce into his 
argument to the jury statements unsupported by 
evidence produced on the trial and made not as 
expressions of belief or opinion, but as assertions 
of fact. Judicial censure of misstatements of the 
evidence by counsel in arguing their case or state-
ments of facts not in evidence or not warranted 
as a deduction fron1 the evidence has been equally 
emphatic in both civil and criminal cases." 
See also 88 CJS, p. 354, Trials, Section 181 (a). 
In his argument Counsel \Yas attempting first to 
bring in matters which ·were not in evidence as to the use 
to \vhich the land lying between the survey lines had been 
put; and secondly to argue a matter which \\·as no longer 
an issue in the case, since the court had determined as a 
n1atter of la\Y that appellants and their predecessors 
in interest had failed to prove a prescriptive use of re-
spondents' property. 
The sole issue for the jury in this connection was 
whether the Bush & Gudgell survey or the Wilkins survey 
was correct. Absent a showing of a boundary by acqui-
escence, adverse user, or a prescriptive right the question 
of hmv the property was used is conlpletel:- in11naterial. 
This was pointed out by appellants' counsel in obtaining 
the exclusion of ~Ir. vVhitney's testi1nony of the recog-
ni/';ed property line prior to 1\fr. \Y ood's acquisition. 
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,, it n<'~~p:-;, P<H'h of whmn had 1neasured to location of 
the diyi:-;ion line between the properties. An examination 
of t h<' beginning point technique used by Mr. vVilkins 
all(l the 1nethods used to run his survey line 1nakes it 
<'lPar as to why the jury chose to believe the correctness 
of the line as found by both Mr. Gudgell and Mr. Coon. 
Appellants under the survey of Bush & Gudgell have the 
full SO feet. which they purchased, and have no right what-
soever to any of respondents' land. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS COON. 
Arnold W. Coon, a licensed engineer and land sur-
n•yor, ·was called as a rebuttal witness by plaintiffs. He 
had been retained by the appellants to check the location 
of the division between appellants and respondents prop-
erty (R. 110). He had previously checked l\ir. Gudgell's 
calculations and procedures in order to determine their 
accuracy (R. 110). Thereafter he ran an independent 
cheek of the location of the Wilkins survey and of the 
Bush & Gudgell survey and tied in both surveys at that 
tin1e (R. 111). The Coon survey located the property 
bolmdary line about three-eighths of an inch in a North-
South direction and two and five-eighths inches in an 
East-\Y est direction from the Bush and Gudgell survey 
location (R. 114). He had found the loeation of the Wil-
kins boundary line to be 17.2 feet distant from that of 
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l\fr. Gudgell in a line which would be approximately par-
allel to the front lot line of Lot No. 11 (R. 112-13). 
The witness was asked, based upon his own calcula-
tions of the line, whether in his opinion the Wilkins lo-
cation of the line was correct or incorrect. The court, 
prior to the witness answering the question, asked him 
whether or not he had a professional knowledge that he 
was calling upon and was not Inaking a guess as to 
whether or not the Wilkins survey was correct (R. 113). 
When the witness stated that he did, the court permitted 
him to answer question, and the witness testified that his 
survey would indicate that the Wilkins survey was in-
correct (R. 114). 
Counsel for appellants objected that the question was 
leading, suggestive and calling for a conclusion which was 
_not the province of the jury. The objection was overruled 
(R. 113). This ruling of the Court is argued on appeal as 
being reversible error. 
The opinion expressed by witness Coon was based 
upon his own investigation and expert lmowledge. He wa:; 
testifying as an expert in a field as to which the jury as 
layn1en would need assistance in determining the question 
·which was before then1. It is submitted that this form of 
expert opinion would not be objectionable as being "·with-
in the province of the jury" even in those jurisdictions 
still adhering to this illogical rule of evidence. 
However, without delving into the academics of 
whether or not this fonn of expert opinion goes to the 
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ultimate issue of fact or not, it is sub1nitted that the 
rules of evidence enunciated h:v this Court render this 
form of opinion evidence unobjectionable. In the recent 
ea::;e::-; decided ~~~- this court bearing upon the point raised 
in appellanhs' brief, this court had adopted the position 
Pxpre::-;::;ed in \\'ignwre on Evidence, Third Edition, Sec-
tions 1920 and 1921. 
The n1ost recent Utah case found bearing upon this 
point is the case of Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latte.r-day 
Sai11fs H ospi.tal,. 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P (2nd) 330. In dis-
posing of certain points assigned as error, the court says : 
"The first is plaintiffs contention that a nurse 
who cared for deceased could not express an 
opinon that she was given good nursing care. The 
objection was on the ground that this was the 
ver~~ issue to be decided by the jury, and the wit-
ness thus invaded its province. This objection is 
untenable. Whether the testiinony of an expert is 
as 'to the very issue before the jury' is not a 
proper test as to its admissability. vVhere the 
subject of inquiry is in a field beyond the knowl-
edge generally possessed by laymen, one properly 
qualified therein n1ay be permitted to testify to 
his opinion as an expert. If the opinion evidence 
is such that it will aid the jury in understanding 
their problems and lead the1n to the truth as to 
disputed issues of fact, it is competent and ad-
Inissable, irrespective of whether it bears directly 
on the ultimate fact the jury is to determine. And 
the trial judge is allowed a wide discretion in re-
gard to the allowance of such testimony." 
The dissent in this case by Justices :McDonough and 
Henriod goes to other points involved in the case. On the 
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point above cited, the dissenting op1n10n says: "Since 
I agree with the court's disposition of the other errors 
assigned, I would affirm the judgment below." 
Noteworthy in connection with the point here under 
consideration is that the Committee on Uniform Rules of 
Evidence, appointed by the Utah Supreme Court, in its 
Final Draft of the Rules of Evidence submitted to this 
Court on l\1arch 2, 1959, at page 31, in Rule 56 ( 4) recom-
mends the adoption of the rule as stated in the Joseph 
case above cited, as follows: 
" ( 4) Testimony in the form of opinions or 
inferences otherwise admissable under these rules, 
is not objectionable because it embraces the ulti-
mate issue or issues to be decided by the trier of 
the fact.'' 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS RESPECTING DAM-
AGES IS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW WITH 
RESPE.CT THERETO. 
Although, as appellants' brief states, the main issue 
of the case involves the question of entitlement to the 
property as discussed above, appellants also contend the 
court erred in giving Instruction No. 13 which dealt with 
dmnages ·which the jury might award to respondents. 
Upon the instructions given, the jury awarded plain-
tiffs the sum of $295.00. 
Before discussing the legal questions involved, com-
Inent should be 1nade on the conversations of court 
and counsel relative to a settle1nent of the dmnage ques-
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tion al'ter the jury retired to deliberate and as counsel 
wpn• taking exceptions to instructions. Appellants' brief 
('onveys the ilnpreHsion the court was intending to change 
its complete instruction with respect to damages. This is 
not tlH• ease. After the jury retired to deliberate, the 
(·ourt suggested to the parties that they might resolve 
their differences with regard to damages by a stipulation 
that regardless of the jury's verdict, defendants would 
pay plaintiffs one-half the cost of the survey which the 
jury found was correct (R. 143). The court was only 
expressing a personal impression of a satisfactory settle-
ment of the dmnage question (which would have amount-
ed to $240.00 as the case turned out). Apart from the 
possibility that the parties n1ight stipulate to such a set-
tlement, these con1ments were not intensfed to have any 
effect in the case. 
Turning then to the instruction given, each part will 
be discussed in the order given by the court. Part (a) 
of the instruction was a correct statement of the la\v that 
for wrongful detention and use of property the measure 
of dan1ages is the reasonable rental value of the pren1ises 
during the period for which the damages are claimed. 
See Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58 Utah 518, 199 Pac. 670 
nt 677-8; 15 A1n. Jur., p. 540, Damages, Section 131. 
~Ir. Holt, a real estate appraiser, was the only wit-
ness with respect to the value of the premises. He testi-
fied that the fair market value of the lot used by defend-
ants was $2500.00 (R. 35), and that the reasonable rental 
value for such a lot would be $250.00 per year (R. 36). 
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In appellants' brief it is contended there is no evidence 
of any rental value, based on the witness's statement in 
response to a question from the ·Court that property was 
of value to the public only for cabins. 
The net effect of this testimony is that of creating 
a factual question for the jury as to what was the reason-
able rental value of the property, and the Court so in-
structed the jury. Appellants used respondents' property 
for five and one-half years as a cabin site. This was the 
precise use for which the land had its value. 
Part (b) of the instruction dealt with cost of removal 
of structures put on land by appellants and reRtoration 
of premises by plaintiff. The costs of ren1oving struc-
tures from pren1ises wrongfully placed thereon and 
restoring the premises to their former condition is 
recoverable as damage against the wrongdoer. Blood 
vs. Cohen) 330 l\1ass. 385, 113 N. E. 2d -±-±8. The court 
instructed the jury that they could take into account 
that respondents might not incur any expense for this 
item unless respondents desired to remove the structures. 
l\1r. Ketchum, an expert witness with respect to demo-
lition and moving of structures, testified that in order 
to remove the structure without substantial damage to 
trees and foliage, it would cost respondents $100.00 
(R. 31). 
In part (c) of the instruction, the court instructed 
that the jur:· could award to respondents as damages 
one-half of the survey costs which the:· might find re-
~pondents were required to expend as a result of de-
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l't>ndant~ ad~ in putting structures on respondents land 
:uHl refusing to rmnove the1n. The evidence is clear 
that in the conversations between appellants and re-
spondents, appellants indicated that if respondents could 
dt>uwn~trate where the correct property line was, ap-
pellants would remove the structures (R. 47, 87). Re-
~pondents advised appellants that if they would not 
remove the cabin otherwise, respondents would be forced 
to have the survey made to show where the correct line 
wa8 ( R. -t 7-8). The survey costs in this case are not 
c.ontended for as a matter of taxable costs, such as 
the authorities cited in appellants' brief consider, but 
rather as dmnages directly and proximately resulting 
from appellants' tortious conduct in erecting a cabin 
on respondents' land and refusing to remove it. 
It is submitted that in such a case the entire 
amount of the survey expenses should be recoverable. 
However, the trial court followed the ruling of this court 
in the case of Davvs vs. Dav~s, 111 Utah 324, 178 Pac. 
(2nd) 394, wherein this court approved the assessment 
of costs of surveys of land evenly between the land-
owners in an action between adjoining landowners In-
volving the location of the true boundary line. 
Here we have a situation where respondents would 
not have incurred the survey costs but for appellants 
building the cabin on respondents' land. In such a 
situation, these survey expenses are properly awarded 
as damages. 
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In considering the damages as a whole, it cannot 
be contended that the appellants have received unjust 
treatment in the verdict of $295.00 for five and one-half 
years use of respondents' land. By comparison, respond-
ents paid out $685.34 in survey expenses alone in order 
to get the survey line correctly established so appellants 
would get off their land. Manifestly, the establishment 
of a correct boundary line is of equal benefit to both 
adjoining landowners. It is therefore submitted that 
there was no prejudicial error cmmnitted in connection 
with the damages awarded by the jury in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully urged that there was no error 
committed prejudicing appellants and the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & 
LOWE and THOMAS C. 
CUTHBERT, 
Attorneys for Respondents 
1001 \Y alker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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